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Introduction
 English prepositions have been found to pose tremendous 
difficulties for English learners (Jiménez Catalán, 1996; Munnich, 
2002).  These difficulties can have a debilitating effect on 
acquisition, as prepositions occur frequently in English, where they 
account for 12% of word class tokens and are thus more common 
than adjectives, adverbs, and pronouns (Francis & Kučera, 1982, p. 
547).  Indeed, prepositions are among the most frequently occurring 
words in English.  For example, of, in, to, for, with, on and at, used 
as prepositions, are the 3rd, 6th, 10th, 12th, 15th, 18th, and 21st most 
common words respectively (p. 465).
 The ubiquity and importance of English prepositions has 
spurred interest in developing adequate semantic accounts of this 
word class.  As discussed by Tyler and Evans (2003), researchers 
have traditionally sought to account for the semantics of English 
prepositions from three general perspectives.  A homonymy 
perspective assumes that English prepositions have various senses 
that are unrelated.  This contrasts with a monosemy perspective 
according to which each preposition has a single highly abstract 
meaning.  The polysemy perspective, on the other hand, assumes 
that prepositions have different yet related meanings.
 Polysemy accounts of prepositions tend to employ radial 
categories.  Lakoff (1987) put forth the idea of radial categories 
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using, as one example, the polysemous Japanese classifier hon. 
His analysis revealed that while extensions of meaning within 
polysemy networks were motivated by a relationship between 
an original and extended sense, these extensions could not be 
predicted through any basic principles.  He also demonstrated that 
meaning extensions, as they diverged from a core sense, often 
ceased to have a feature in common with some of the other senses 
within the network. In his view, related senses connect to the same 
network of representations, but are distinctly listed within that 
network1. 
 In the Cognitive Linguistics (CL) theoretical framework, senses 
within a polysemy network are thought to be related to other 
senses in systematic ways, based on the relationships between the 
landmark (the background element of a scene), the trajector (the 
generally smaller, mobile, focal element of a scene), and the vantage 
point (the assumed perspective).  In a typical meaning network 
of a preposition, a basic proto-scene gives rise to a polysemy 
network of distinct yet related meanings.  To give an example of 
an analysis of a spatial scene, the perceptual accessibility sense of 
the spatial particle IN, which occurs in phrases such as in view, in 
sight, and in earshot, is based on a spatial configuration in which 
both the vantage point and trajector are situated in the interior 
of the landmark (Tyler & Evans, 2003, pp. 191-193).  An iconic 
representation of the schema is shown in Figure 1.
 1 This conception of semantic representation has received some empirical 
support from recent brain research (MacGregor, Bouwsema, & Klepousniotou, 
2015; Pylkkänen, Llinas, & Murphy, 2006)
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Figure 1. Schema for perceptual accessibility sense of IN.
 The disappearance sense of IN, on the other hand, is based on 
a distinctly different configuration in which the vantage point is 
situated outside of an opaque landmark and the trajector enters 
the landmark so as to disappear from sight (Tyler & Evans, 2003, 
p. 195).  This sense appears in expressions such as She rubbed the 
suntan lotion in.  This schema is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Schema for disappearance sense of IN.
 
Semantic Analysis of Prepositions
 The current study puts forth a semantic analysis of the 
polysemy network of the preposition FOR.  Tyler and Evans (2003) 
put forth various methodological criteria for determining distinct 
senses of a polysemy network.  First, each sense should involve 
－ 4－
a different configuration of the trajector and landmark than that 
found in the proto-scene.  Second, there must be instances in which 
the sense is context-independent and thus cannot be inferred based 
solely on the context of its occurrence. Partly based on earlier 
work by Langacker (1987), Tyler and Evans also list various 
indications that a sense has central status within a given polysemy 
network: (1) early appearance diachronically, (2) occurrence in 
composite lexical units (e.g., the use of over in its covering sense 
in overgarment), (3) occurrence of the sense as a key dimension 
distinguishing a contrasting set of items (e.g., above, over, under, 
and below), (4) traceability of all senses to the central sense, and 
(5) predominance within a network. Predominance is a vague 
criterion.  One empirically verifiable aspect of predominance that 
appears in the semantic analysis of FOR presented in this paper 
involves speakers' tendency to assume that a given sense (i.e., a 
more central sense) is intended when a preposition is used in a 
decontextualized sentence (e.g., the meaning of for in It's for her).  
 The presence of a distinct sense can also be inferred from 
differing constraints.  For example, only some senses of FOR 
require that the trajector have positive associations.  This can 
be tested by employing the same trajector in a negative context 
to determine whether the ensuing sentence results in infelicity. 
Hence, The hotel worker made up the bed for her is acceptable, but 
The hotel worker messed up the bed for her is odd because FOR in 
this context is naturally construed as involving benefit (discussed 
below).  The same constraint is not present for the situational 
valence sense of FOR (discussed below) as we can see from 
sentence pairs such as This snack is good for kids and This snack is 
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bad for kids.
 The existence of irony, seen frequently in jokes, can also be 
used to infer the existence of multiple senses.  Indeed, irony may 
provide important semantic insights if Giora's (1997) Graded 
Salience Hypothesis is correct.  Giora, focusing primarily on the 
literal and figurative meaning of idioms, claims that senses are 
mentally accessed at different speeds due to their ºsalience."  She 
defines salient meanings as those that are conventional, frequent, 
familiar, and enhanced by preceding context.  Irony can appear 
when speakers initially process the more salient meaning of an 
expression and then subsequently process an intended meaning 
that is less salient.  When conducting a semantic analysis, effects 
of irony may provide a highly useful insight based on the fact 
that any prepositional sense that is employed as the intended 
sense in a double-entendre context (in particular, one that is 
devoid of informative cues biasing interpretation) should have 
less psychological salience than the initially processed sense. 
Along these same lines, the existence of multiple senses can also 
be inferred from garden path effects, as seen in the following 
sentences:
Dorothy went shopping for a lion.  She went to the butcher to get 
some meat.
Dorothy went shopping for a lion.  She wanted to raise an exotic 
pet.
 Furthermore, it should be noted that a key assumption when 
positing any sense is that the semantic content corresponds 
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to a psychologically plausible linguistic category.  This can be 
determined in several ways. First, the sense should conform to the 
embodiment assumption (see Rohrer, 2007), meaning that it should 
be relevant to typical human interaction with the environment 
for typical human purposes.  For example, a sense defined solely 
in terms of topological features (e.g., the often-encountered notion 
that the preposition AT signifies adjacency to a point) could be 
questioned on the grounds that the posited sense ignores the 
fact human beings' interaction with objects in space is strongly 
constrained by forces such as gravity, the reach and orientation 
of human limbs and sensory organs, limitations in the range of 
human senses, and so on.  Second, the existence of a distinct sense 
as part of the linguistic repertoire of another language could 
be used to prove the sense's plausibility. This is so even if the 
sense is expressed via different parts of speech or via different 
means (e.g., as a syntactic pattern or as a morpheme).  This will 
henceforth be referred to as the ºcrosslinguistic example criterion 
for plausibility."
Analysis of FOR
 The following section will present an analysis of the basic 
senses of the preposition FOR. The analysis adopts insights from 
Tyler and Evans (2003), Tyler, Mueller, and Ho (2011), and Mueller 
(2012).  The preposition FOR has been selected for analysis as 
it has been treated in depth only by a few researchers (Bennett, 
1975; Herskovits, 1986; Tyler & Evans, 2003).  Much of the analysis 
presented here is therefore new and speculative.  For purposes of 
clarification, diagrams showing the landmark and trajector have 
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been provided for each posited sense.
 Intention.  The basic sense of FOR is related to intention 
or purpose (cp. Tyler & Evans, 2003, pp. 146-149).  Prototypical 
collocates include intended for, used for and tools for.  The basic 
schema is typically employed when a human being regards a 
trajector (often an artifact) as facilitative for some purpose (the 
landmark).  The landmark does not need to be a goal, per se. 
Quite often, it simply picks out a relevant domain within which 
the trajector plays a facilitative role.  For example, in the sentence 
He was treated for a headache, the headache is clearly not a goal 
or purpose, rather it is the domain for which the treatment was 
intended.  This distinction is important as it constrains the felicity 
of FOR when it contrasts with similar sentences with a direct 
object in place of the preposition.  For example, in the sentence She 
searched the yard for her lost ring, the yard is what's being searched 
but the ring is the actual purpose of the search. 
 When applied to reasoning processes, quite often the 
purpose is a justification related to the landmark. For example, 
in the sentence He had no excuse for being late, the excuse is a 
justification being applied to a particular domain (tardiness). 
Other examples would include arguments for, explanations for, 
rationale for, reason for, strategies for, and so on.  The extension 
toward justification may also be motivated by FOR's ground sense 
discussed below.  The considerable number of frequently occurring 
collocations involving the intention sense suggests that this sense 
is one of the most salient senses of FOR for native speakers (NSs). 
Iconically, this sense can be represented as in Figure 3 as a person 
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(a trajector) moving toward a landmark based on some purpose 
(represented by the thought bubble).
Figure 3.  Schema for intention sense of FOR.
 
 Intermediary intention.  Especially when appearing with 
certain verbs of locomotion, FOR can highlight an immediate 
goal that is associated with a more general purpose (for a related 
discussion, see Bennett, 1975, p. 92; Tyler & Evans, 2003, p. 153). 
This will be treated as a peripheral sense here as it appears with 
less frequency within a narrow range of contexts.  Examples 
include bound for, dash for, head for, make a beeline for (the door), 
move for (the exit), race for, run for, scramble for, set sail for (a new 
land), and start for (the door).
 As Tyler and Evans (2003) show, FOR contrasts with TO in 
these examples in that TO implies reaching the landmark (e.g., He 
ran to the hill and back, versus ?He ran for the hill and back).  They 
further point out that FOR's implication of oblique intention makes 
it infelicitous when no intention is present (e.g., The balloon floated 
to the ceiling is acceptable, in contrast with, ?The balloon floated for 
the ceiling).
 It may further be noted that many of the examples involve 
haste and tend to highlight the initial phase of an action 
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(Lindstromberg, 2010; Tyler & Evans, 2003).  This may explain the 
preference for TOWARD versus FOR in He carefully and slowly 
crawled toward the door.  When haste and incipient action are 
implied, some verbs that do not refer directly to locomotion but 
simply involve movement are possible (e.g., The gunslinger went for 
his gun).  Iconically, the sense can be represented as in Figure 4, 
which is similar to the intention sense except that the focus is on 
an intermediary goal (e.g., the door in He ran for the door), leaving 
the underlying motivation of the action (the larger circle) to be 
inferred (i.e., his running for the door was ultimately motivated by 
his desire to escape). 
Figure 4.  Schema for intermediary intention sense of FOR.
 
 Distance.  The distance sense appears to be related to the 
purpose sense.  If someone headed for Tokyo, it is possible for 
them to view the act of traversing the distance (e.g., traveling 
200 kilometers) as the purpose of the travel.  This may have 
led to the development of a sense that can be glossed as extent 
(Bennett, 1975) or distance.  The sense often appears with verbs 
describing locomotion (e.g., She drove for many miles). Iconically, 
the representation, shown in Figure 5, is similar to that of purpose 
except that the landmark is related to spatial distance and 
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intention is de-emphasized.
Figure 5.  Schema for distance sense of FOR.
 
 Duration.  FOR is used to refer to the extent of a state 
or action through time (Bennett, 1975).  It has important 
contrasts with IN in that FOR can force an atelic reading of an 
accomplishment verb (e.g., He learned Japanese for a year versus He 
learned Japanese in a year).2  Empirical research would suggest that 
extension of meaning to temporal dimensions is based on spatial 
meaning (Boroditsky, 2000).  Indeed, such extensions, which are 
commonly encountered in language (Clark, 1973; Gentner, Imai, 
& Boroditsky, 2002), represent the correlation between movement 
through space and movement through time (hence, the ambiguity 
in expressions such as a long journey). Some empirical evidence 
from patients with different types of brain damage provides 
evidence that the distance and duration senses can be dissociated 
(Kemmerer, 2005).  An iconic representation of this sense (Figure 6) 
would resemble that of distance but with the focus now on time.
　 　
 2 For a related discussion, see Bennett (1975). Accomplishment verbs are 
telic and nonpunctual (Vendler, 1957).
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Figure 6.  Schema for duration sense of FOR.
 
 Benefit.  When someone acts with a specific purpose in mind 
and the purpose involves another person, it is often the case 
that the act is aimed at benefiting the other person.3  This leads 
to a distinct benefit sense in which some action, or an artifact 
associated with an action, often serves as the trajector associated 
with an animate landmark. Evidence for benefit as a distinct sense 
comes from the fact that the benefit sense, unlike the intention 
sense, is constrained to situations involving positive semantic 
prosody.4  Evidence for a distinct benefit sense, as opposed to a 
purpose sense, can be observed in the comical double-entendre 
evident in the following exchange:
Woman #1: Why don't you do something special for your husband 
on his birthday?
Woman #2: Yeah, right. After putting up with all of his 
　 　
 3 Tyler and Evans (2003) divided this sense into an “intended recipient 
sense” and a “benefactive sense” (p. 154). This division seems to be 
excessively fine-grained as the extension from one sense to another 
should be possible using inferences of a very general nature. For this 
reason, these two senses have been combined in the present analysis.
 4 Louw (1993) defines semantic prosody as “a consistent aura of meaning 
with which a form is imbued by its collocates” (p. 157).
－ 12－
shenanigans this last year, I'm tempted to put some poison in a 
cake̶just for him.
 
 The humor in the exchange arises from the fact that FOR can 
be interpreted as benefit (i.e., the purpose is that he should enjoy 
it) or as intention (i.e., the purpose of baking the cake is that he̶
and not someone else̶should eat it).  As Lindstromberg (2010) 
points out, FOR, as opposed to TO, is linked closely with intention 
instead of movement.  As observed in the sentences, Why did you 
eat that cake?  That piece was for him, FOR can only be viewed as 
marking intention as the piece of cake in this example never made 
it to the intended recipient.
 The benefit sense occurs with great frequency. Common 
examples include FOR used to mark roles of assumed benefit 
within professional situations (e.g., She's an attorney for the firm). 
Some uses of this sense appear to involve a folk theory about 
the benefits of positive mental energies (e.g., Few would weep for 
Gaddafi, but targeting him wasn't right). Collocations that involve 
this sense appear frequently in the American National Corpus 
(Reppen, Ide, & Sunderman, 2005), and the meaning seems to be 
central within FOR's semantic network. This would suggest that 
this sense of FOR is highly salient.  This is furthermore suggested 
by an apparent preference to use the benefit sense as a default 
interpretation of FOR when reading vague sentences placed outside 
of context such as He did it for her or Who's it for?  In the iconic 
representation of the sense (Figure 7), notice that the landmark is 
associated with positive benefit as depicted by the smiley.
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Figure 7.  Schema for benefit sense of FOR.
 
 Proxy.  In order to benefit another person, people commonly 
perform a task in their stead.  In a sentence such as Akiko taught 
the class for him, the benefit derives from Akiko's acting as a 
substitute. When interpreting this sentence, the focus can either be 
on the benefit or the substitution itself.  This has led to a distinct 
sense in which the beneficial aspect of the action is semantically 
bleached.  In some cases, the proper identification of the proxy 
sense as opposed to a benefit sense is difficult as benefit can be 
implied (e.g., She has sympathy for him). However, many examples 
clearly have no sense of benefit (e.g., ºOhayo" is Japanese for ºgood 
morning," or Do you take me for a fool?). The contrast between 
proxy and benefit can be observed in the following sentences.
He taught for her.  (She owned the school.)
He taught for her.  (She was sick that day.)
 The second sentence remains somewhat ambiguous, but 
it is possible to further constrain the context so that only a 
proxy reading is possible.  We can imagine a scenario such as 
the following: she hated to have anybody teach her class and 
understood that she would be fired when the school saw how 
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much better Hiroshi was at teaching, so she was enraged when she 
learned that he had taught for her while she was sick. 
 The iconic representation of the sense (Figure 8) shows that 
the trajector replaces the landmark in some way (e.g., by filling a 
role or function).  Intention is often de-emphasized or absent (thus 
the dotted lines).
Figure 8.  Schema for proxy sense of FOR.
 
 Exchange.  In many typical cases, a human being is performing 
an action while mindful of the potential benefit of the action to 
others.5  In other cases, human beings are not so altruistic and 
focus instead on envisioned compensation for their actions.  This 
may explain the development of an exchange sense that is evident 
in sentences such as He paid $1000 for the car, and so on.  The 
proxy and exchange senses are so close in meaning that it may 
appear that they can be combined to achieve greater parsimony 
within the semantic account of FOR senses; yet it should be noted 
that it is possible to create sentence contexts that are ambiguous in 
terms of the two senses.  For example, the sentence He handed the 
　 　
 5 The discussion of this sense closely follows analysis developed by 
Andrea Tyler.
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money over for her could receive the following two interpretations, 
reflecting the proxy and exchange senses respectively:
He handed the money over for her (because she couldn't hand it 
over herself).
He handed the money over for her (because she'd been kidnapped).
 The iconic representation of this sense (Figure 9) shows that 
the trajector's benefit often receives no focus or is absent (thus 
the faded smiley).  The arrow indicates that the intention typically 
involves notions of reciprocity.
Figure 9.  Schema for exchange sense of FOR.
 
 Grounds.  In typical exchanges, one party is motivated to give 
something as the result of having received something.  In other 
words, the act of giving is the result and the act of receiving the 
cause.  Through semantic bleaching, this may have led to a more 
abstract sense that simply attributes a result (the trajector) to a 
specific cause (the landmark). This sense figures prominently in 
the language of culpability (e.g., arrested for, blamed for, caught hell 
for, charged for, fired for, held in contempt for, in prison for, penalties 
for, punishment for, and sued for). Other examples would include 
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famous for, grateful for, hospitalized for, noted for, and renown for. 
The iconic representation of this sense (Figure 10) is similar to 
that of exchange except that the trajector and landmark elements 
now represent elements of a basic causal schema. 
Figure 10.  Schema for grounds sense of FOR.
 
 Situational valence.  The benefit sense implies that an action 
is performed while focusing on the possible benefit of an action. 
In some situations, it is possible to consider both the positive and 
negative effects of an entity, event, or general situation on an 
ideal conception of affairs.  For example, the sentence Junk food 
is bad for children states that a trajector (junk food) hinders the 
landmark (i.e., the plans and hopes) that people typically have for 
children.  Likewise, the sentence This job would be good for John 
refers to a conception of some ideal situation regarding John.  If 
the sentence is turned around to read John would be perfect for this 
job, it suggests that the speaker has some ideal conception of the 
state of affairs regarding the job (which is now the landmark). 
Unlike the benefit sense, the situational valence sense allows for 
trajectors with both positive and negative prosody.  The iconic 
representation (Figure 11) shows that the idea of benefit has given 
way to a general notion of an ideal state of affairs.  The erased 
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lower half of the smiley shows that the sense allows for both 
positive and negative prosody.
Figure 11.  Schema for situational valence sense of FOR.
 Topicalization.  Semantic bleaching of the situational valence 
sense leads to an extremely general schema that is similar, in 
many ways, to the differentiation between topic and comment.  The 
comment, in this sense, serves as the trajector, which is understood 
within the general context of the landmark.  This sense appears 
in sentences such as The team's tied for last place, It's common for 
there to be storms in this area, and I'm late for work.  Quite often, 
this sense picks out a specific dimension of a situation as the 
particular domain of relevance (e.g., He looks young for his age, 
That's normal for this time of year, and The nozzle may be adjusted 
for height).6 The iconic representation of this sense (Figure 12) 
is similar to that of situational valence except that intention has 
given way to the more abstract notion of a comment and the 
　 　
 6 Lindstromberg (2010) glosses this as ºin relation to a norm" and gives 
the example, ºFor a woman of 90, she's very active."  This ºin relation 
to a norm" sense would pass the crosslinguistic example criterion for 
plausibility, as it is associated with distinct constructions in other 
languages (e.g., chikonun in Korean).
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landmark is now simply a general topic.
Figure 12.  Schema for topicalization sense of FOR.
 
 Expected response.  In some situations, actions performed with 
a specific intent in mind involve agents who can be expected to 
respond in a prototypical manner.  For example, a person calling 
a doctor can assume that the doctor will not remain completely 
passive and will respond in some typical way.  In these limited 
circumstances, FOR may be used to mark this expectation (A. 
Tyler, personal communication, July 1, 2010).  Typical examples 
include appeal for, ask for, beg for, demands for, gesture for, plea 
for, proposal for, request for, and signal for.  The human actors that 
fill the landmark slot (e.g., doctors, the fire department, and the 
police) tend to be associated with prototypical responses.  This 
explains the infelicity associated with the fourth sentence below:
 1.  He called the police.
 2.  He called for the police.
 3.  He called his neighbor.
 4.  ?He called for his neighbor.
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 When abstract actions are associated with the landmark, they 
often directly refer to the response (e.g., He called for help, and 
This abhorrent action has led to demands for a prompt response). The 
sense typically appears with verbs of communication. Iconically, 
the sense is represented as in Figure 13 by a landmark element 
that is capable of responding in a typical manner based on the 
trajector's intention.
Figure 13.  Schema for expected response sense of FOR.
 
 Desire.  In some situations, the focus can shift from the 
response to the desire for a response (A. Tyler, personal 
communication, July 1, 2010).  In the sentence She's longing for a 
visit from her son, the desired visit can be viewed as a response 
to the longing; however, because the person's desire is not 
necessarily expressed, the response cannot be directly attributed 
to the emotion.  This sense is evident in the following phrases 
and sentences, He's spoiling for a fight, I'm hungry for something 
different, and She's desperate for a job.  This sense can also subsume 
what Lindstromberg (2010) refers to as the support (e.g., He's for 
the measure) and choice (e.g., opt for change) senses of FOR (p. 
224)7 as these uses also highlight a yearning associated with the 
trajector.  Iconically, the representation (shown in Figure 14) is 
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similar to that of expected response except that the response is 
usually semantically bleached (the white arrow) and the focus has 
shifted to the trajector's emotional state (the heart).  It may be 
plausibly argued that rather than representing a separate sense, 
the use of these emotion-related words with FOR are based on a 
folk theory of emotions (for a related discussion, see Kövecses, 
2010, Ch. 7) in which the emotion is the initial step in a causal 
chain culminating in behaviors that achieve the desired effect.  If 
this position is adopted, the desire sense can be subsumed under 
the intention or, in some cases, under the grounds sense. 
Figure 14.  Schema for desire sense of FOR.
　 　
 7  Lindstromberg's list of senses, designed for completeness and 
pedagogical utility, is arguable too large and theoretically unconstrained. 
He also does not distinguish between motivations for literal versus 
intended meaning.  For example, he includes, ºWhat I wouldn't give for 
a beer!"  as an ºobject of emotion" sense similar to the sense of FOR in 
ºhate somebody for having done something."  The beer example clearly 
appears to be derived from its literal meaning based on exchange, which 
Lindstromberg, incidentally, also lists, glossing it as ºcompensation." 
Alternatively, Lindstromberg's support sense may be associated with the 
benefit sense depicted in Figure 7.
 Polysemy network of FOR.  The polysemy network for FOR 
is shown in Figure 15.  The network is not intended to capture 
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diachronic development.8  Instead, it shows how the senses are 
likely to exist synchronically in terms of their closely related 
schematic structure.
 
Figure 15.  Polysemy network of FOR.
　 　
 8 FOR is different from many English prepositions in that the original 
sense has disappeared (Tyler & Evans, 2003).  It should also be noted 
that patterns of diachronic development have been found to be poor 
predictors of L1 acquisitional patterns (Rice, 1999).  This is likely to 
be true as well for L2 learners, who, in addition to being affected by 




 The current analysis of FOR is both incomplete and tentative. 
One possible criticism is that it posits a considerable number 
of senses and is thus overly unconstrained.  In defense of the 
current approach, it may be mentioned that semantic accounts, 
while being sensitive to Occam's razor, must also be adequately 
narrow (i.e., must avoid positing a small number of overly general 
senses) so that they do not predict preposition use that is clearly 
unacceptable. Positing a large number of senses may be the only 
path to achieving this.
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